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Abstract  
In knowledge intensive industries, an increasing number of firms rely on external knowledge 
sources and draw on the technical expertise of other firms to develop new products. Despite 
the dramatic increase in outsourcing, strategic activities such as New Product Development 
(NPD), few systematic studies on this topic have been carried out. We aim to provide an in-
depth understanding of the criteria used by companies to decide to whom and how to 
outsource NPD in conditions of high technological uncertainty, from supplier’s selection to 
project implementation. The findings emerging from 14 interviews with nine buyers and their 
supplier show that in addition to transaction cost economics and the resource based view of 
the firm, relational exchange theory, and co-creation theory help to explain outsourcing 
decision in NPD contexts. The balance of formal and informal mechanisms, namely trust and 
intellectual property rights emerge as the most important enablers of knowledge and 
information transfer in the implementation phase of outsourcing NPD.     
Keywords outsourcing new product development; supplier selection; project implementation; 
transaction cost economics; resource-based view; relational exchange theory; co-creation 
theory.  
 
1. Introduction 
Modern firms need to innovate rapidly and cost-effectively in order to gain and keep a 
competitive advantage (Salge et al., 2012; Gesing et al., 2014), which makes it impossible for 
these firms to operate independently on their own along with being competitive (McIvor et 
al., 2006). These developments have fostered an increase in outsourcing strategic activities 
and meant that outsourcing has shifted its scope from focusing on peripheral activities such as 
cleaning, catering and security, to encompass more critical business value-creating activities 
such as design, manufacturing, marketing, and logistics (McIvor, 2009).  
More and more firms, especially in knowledge–intensive industries, are faced with the need 
to rely on external knowledge sources and draw on the technical expertise of external partners 
to develop complex products in shorter periods of time (Lichtenthaler, 2011; Chesbrough, 
2006; 2003; Laursen & Salter, 2006). Suppliers of NPD activities possess highly specialized 
knowledge about products and processes, which are often required to produce high quality 
products rapidly and at advantageous costs. Within this context, firms operating in 
knowledge–intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals, automotive, technology, and 
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consumer goods, are increasingly opening up their boundaries and searching for new external 
sources of knowledge (Calatone & Stanko, 2007). 
Thus, externally contracting some NPD tasks has become a common practice among modern 
firms (Alguezaui & Filieri, 2011; Contractor et al., 2011; Stanko & Calantone, 2011). In this 
paper we explore strategic outsourcing (Holcomb & Hitt, 2007; McIvor, 2009), which 
involves the outsourcing of value-creating activities of a ‘knowledge-intensive’ nature such 
as NPD and industrial design, to external suppliers. The specific strategic focus of this study 
is NPD activities, which include the different stages of product concept design and analysis, 
assembly, testing, and manufacturing. For the purpose of this research, we refer to 
outsourcing innovation as crossing the boundaries of the firm via non-equity collaborations or 
contracting to obtain services, knowledge or processes that may support NPD. This may 
include co-developing or purchasing specialised new innovative technological knowledge. 
Research has demonstrated that involving external suppliers can be beneficial to a focal firm 
(e.g. Handfield et al., 1999; Wagner, 2012); however, it can be also productive of negative 
outcomes (e.g. Wynstra, van Weele, & Weggemann, 2001; Van der Valk & Wynstra 2005). 
These mixed results suggest that involving the ‘right’ supplier and managing the 
collaboration process correctly is key when firms decide to involve suppliers in NPD process 
(Wagner & Hoegl, 2006). Critical decisions that firms must consider when they opt for 
involving external suppliers in NPD activities include supplier selection (Wynstra, 
Weggemann, & Van Weele, 2003; Petersen et al., 2005; Wagner, 2010) as well as the 
collaboration and governance mechanisms adopted to manage the outsourcing of NPD 
activities.  
Despite the dramatic increase in outsourcing strategic activities such as NPD, few systematic 
studies on this topic have been completed (Holcomb & Hitt, 2007; McIvor, 2009) and the 
research question of which criteria to use to select suppliers for performing NPD activities 
has only recently received limited attention (Wagner, 2010; Hsuan & Mahnke, 2011). This 
study aims at fulfilling these shortcomings in the literature and attempts to answer the 
following research questions: to whom and how should a firm outsource its new product 
development process?  
In order to provide an in-depth understanding of the outsourcing of NPD-related activities 
from supplier’s selection to project implementation governance mechanisms, we have 
adopted an inductive approach based on qualitative technique and used in-depth interviews 
with managers (e.g. CEO, Chief Operations Officers, Chief Technology Officer) of nine 
buyers and a leading supplier providing full NPD service.  
2. Literature review  
2.1 Strategic Outsourcing  
Outsourcing is an abbreviation for “outside resource using” (Quinn & Hilmer, 1994). 
Strategic outsourcing (SO) refers to the managerial approach to outsourcing in which firms 
rely on intermediate markets to provide specialized capabilities that supplement existing 
capabilities used in production (Holcomb & Hitt, 2007). Outsourcing innovation is a 
relatively new concept that has been extensively researched in the last two decades, yet is not 
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fully explained. Existing studies on this topic have mostly used Transaction Costs Economics 
(TCE) or the Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm to explain the outsourcing decisions.  
TCE seeks to understand the effect that characteristics of a transaction have on governance 
costs (Williamson, 1975; 1979). In the outsourcing literature TCE has been used to answer 
the question of why to outsource, highlighting the role of minimizing costs as well as the risks 
of opportunism arising from the governance of market exchanges (e.g. Williamson, 2008). 
Adopting this perspective, outsourcing decisions are explained by a firm’s need to reduce 
uncertainty, costs and opportunism when making outsourcing decisions. In particular, low 
degrees of asset specificity and uncertainty together with low risks of opportunism and costs 
reduction considerations, favour the decision to outsource to external suppliers.  
The RBV assumes that companies outsource some or part of their production process to focus 
on their core capabilities as well as provide a means to acquire superior resources, 
knowledge, and competencies from external sources (Penrose, 1958; Barney, 1991). In this 
context, RBV theorists assume that a firm should focus on valuable, rare, imperfectly 
imitable resources that provide them with a unique competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Barney, 1991; Lavie, 2006). RBV claims that heterogeneous resources resulting in unique 
and inimitable capabilities should be internalised while complementary capabilities should be 
sourced externally.  
More recently, scholars have started to view RBV and TCE as complementary theories for 
explaining outsourcing decisions and have sought to integrate them. For instance, McIvor 
(2009) has emphasised the critical and complementary role of both TCE and RBV in the 
fields of business improvement and process re-design.  However, both theories may not fully 
explain outsourcing decisions in the NPD context.  On one side outsourcing decisions are not 
fully dictated by TCE considerations because costs considerations are no longer the primary 
concern for companies’ seeking to outsource strategic activities (Ellram, Tate, & Billington, 
2008; McIvor, 2009); while on the other side firms have started to outsource (sometimes  
even offshore), value-based activities, which can be source of competitive advantage 
(Contractor et al., 2011).     
2.2 Outsourcing NPD  
The existing literature on the analysis of supplier integration in NPD has produced 
contrasting results. Some scholars suggest that involving suppliers in NPD activities can lead 
to benefits including reduced costs, reduced development time (e.g., Clark 1989; Ragatz, 
Handfield & Scannell 1997; Petersen, Handfield & Ragatz, 2005), improved product 
manufacturability, better product quality (McGinnis & Vallopra, 1999; Handfield et al., 1999; 
Primo & Amundson 2002; Ragatz et al., 2002; Petersen et al. 2005), and improved design-for 
manufacturability (e.g., Wasti & Liker, 1997, Swink, 1999); while others have highlighted 
the drawbacks of involving suppliers in NPD (e.g. Laursen & Salter, 2006; Wynstra, van 
Weele, & Weggemann, 2001;Ciravegna & Maielli, 2011; Zirpoli & Becker, 2011; Salge et 
al., 2013).  
The mixed results in the literature on supplier involvement in NPD suggests there is a need 
for a more in-depth approach to studying outsourcing innovation decisions, as well as further 
exploration of the problems firms face when they involve suppliers in the NPD and how they 
try to deal with them (Wagner & Hoegl, 2006). Some academics have started to address these 
issues and identified stages in the ‘outsourcing decision making process’ (McIvor, 2000; 
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Franceschini et al., 2003; Van Weele, 2005). For instance, scholars commonly recognize two 
critical decisions that firms must perform in the innovation outsourcing process: supplier 
selection and implementation or management (Wynstra, Weggemann, & Van Weele 2003; 
Petersen et al., 2005; Wagner, 2010). In this study we focus on the outsourcing of the NPD 
process and seek to understand how firms choose among suppliers (supplier selection) as 
well as how they manage their outsourced NPD-related activities (implementation). The 
selection stage refers to the time frame when the firm recognizes the importance of 
outsourcing, identifies, and evaluates which parts of the innovation process to outsource and 
chooses the outsourcing partner or the service provider and its location. On the other hand, 
during the implementation stage, the firm creates the processes and structures deemed to be 
necessary for successful outsourcing. Below we discuss the literature referring to both stages 
of the outsourcing process.  
2.3 Supplier Selection: To whom to outsource NPD activities? 
A key strategic decision in the outsourcing of the NPD process is the selection of an 
appropriate provider. Selecting the right supplier can have a significant impact on the 
effectiveness of a NPD team (Petersen et al., 2005). There are different criteria that the buyer 
needs to take into consideration when selecting from a pool of potential suppliers. TCE and 
RBV are the theories that have been mainly used to explain partner selection in the 
outsourcing literature (Holcomb & Hitt, 2007; Hoegl & Wagner, 2005). However, the main 
component of TCE is the firms’ concern on costs, which nowadays have become a less 
critical factor in selecting a supplier especially under situations of high technological 
uncertainty (Ho et al., 2010).  
The proponents of the RBV have shown that an increasing number of firms select partners 
that allow them the access to their superior resources (Odagiri, 2003; Howells et al., 2008). 
By the same token, outsourcing innovation can involve the externalization of core capabilities 
(e.g. knowledge-generating activities), which contradicts the assumptions of RBV proponents 
in terms of internalising the firm’s core competencies (Alguezaui & Filieri, 2011).  
Studies in marketing, strategy, and innovation claim that the most important factors in 
supplier selection are related to: the supplier’s characteristics in terms of geographical 
proximity (Schiele, 2006); competence in mastering a new or complex technology;  supplier 
innovation potential (Wagner & Hoegl, 2006); technical and commercial performance 
measures and targets (Petersen et al., 2005); collaboration history (Kale & Zollo, 2006; 
Rundquist, 2008); and having ‘good enough’ knowledge that can resolve specific problems 
(Rundquist & Halila, 2010). The capabilities of a supplier of NPD should match the buying 
company’s needs (Petersen et al., 2005).  
Under conditions of high uncertainty though, it has been demonstrated that the supplier’s 
ability and willingness to cooperate are much more important than the technological 
competency (Tyler, 2001). Along the same vein, Rundquist (2008) found that firms tend to 
outsource their NPD activities to suppliers with close ties that they have a previous history of 
relations with, rather than those with ‘world class’ knowledge or strategic resources. 
According to Hoetker (2005) the role of capabilities, past relationships, and being an internal 
or external supplier is contingent upon the level of uncertainty of the desired innovative 
component. Hoetker’s (2005) study suggests that when uncertainty of the desired component 
is low, the differences in supplier’s technical capabilities seem to be the primary basis to 
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make a decision regarding to whom to outsource. However, as uncertainty increases, prior 
relationships and a supplier being internal become relatively more important than the 
technical capabilities (ibid.). Additionally, other scholars stress the importance of assessing 
long-term orientation of the supplier as it enhances collaboration under technological 
uncertainty (Emden et al., 2006). In view of this literature, it is evident that few studies have 
attempted to provide an in-depth understanding of partner selection criteria in outsourcing 
NPD decisions (Wagner, 2010; Hsuan & Mahnke, 2011). Thus the first research question of 
the study is: 
RQ 1 - How do buyers select suppliers when outsourcing NPD activities?   
2.4 Supplier Management: how to outsource NPD activities  
Outsourcing innovation requires efforts to constantly and continuously coordinate the 
activities between the supplier and the buyer. Formal mechanisms, mainly contracts, are 
utilised for protecting a firms’ proprietary intellectual property; whereas informal 
mechanisms, mainly trust and norms, contribute to building strong relationships.  
However, mutual trust or informal mechanisms do not always guarantee trustworthy 
behaviour and coordinated actions among partners (McEvily et al., 2003); therefore, 
governance mechanisms are critical when effectively sourcing innovation from external 
partners. Governance mechanisms include the approaches and mechanisms used to manage 
inter-firm collaborations. Identifying the most effective governance mechanisms in 
outsourcing is paramount because it helps explain the success of NPD projects in buyer-
supplier collaborations (Hoegl & Wagner, 2005).  
According to Wagner (2010), research should focus on the soft facts and human issues 
involved in people interactions from two organizations. Thus, there is a need for the 
conceptualization and analysis of supplier integration at the project level, which may include 
factors that could contribute to explaining successful and unsuccessful collaboration in 
outsourcing innovation projects (Wagner, 2012).  
Studies on the success factors of outsourcing innovation have focused on the composition of 
the project team (Wagner & Hoegl, 2006), task coordination gaps (Gerwin, 2004), specific 
communication and collaboration mechanisms (i.e. Hong & Hartley, 2011; Bhalla & Terjesen, 
2013), or the quality of the collaboration between the buyer and supplier team members 
(Hoegl & Wagner, 2005). Gerwin’s (2004) theoretical model suggests that an important 
factor contributing to the success of joint NPD projects is reducing the coordination gap 
among the collaborative partners. Mismatches between the required and actual coordination 
of tasks have a negative impact on the performance of a NPD project (Gerwin, 2004). 
Commitment is also regarded as a necessary and sufficient condition as commitment 
enhances the cooperative behaviour within inter-firm relationships and is the most important 
factor influencing performance and also has beneficial implications within inter-firm 
relationships as it enhances cooperation and financial performance as well as reduces 
relationship termination and conflict (Liu et al., 2010). 
Hoegl and Wagner (2005) reveal that strong buyer-supplier collaboration is positively related 
with development schedule and development cost efficiency as well as product cost and 
product quality effectiveness for product development projects, while increases in 
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communication frequency and intensity have a curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship 
with project development budgets and product costs. In a subsequent qualitative study, 
Wagner and Hoegl (2006) report that at project level, team members’ compatibility, 
complementarity technical competence, and communication are the most frequently 
mentioned success factors related to project staffing.  
Similarly, in a quantitative study of customer-supplier new development projects Wagner 
(2010) concluded that downstream customer orientation and supplier-customer homophily 
have a significant impact on the customer firms’ NPD efficiency (i.e., project cost and project 
speed) and effectiveness (i.e., innovativeness). More recently, Bhalla and Terjesen (2013) use 
a qualitative approach to investigate the competencies that new firms must possess to realize 
benefits from outsourcing competencies in the biotechnology industry. Narrative interviews 
enabled them to identify integration process facilitators, which included: working jointly, 
seeking understanding, and addressing conflicts and failures in early stages. 
In the current study, we seek to contribute to extant literature by investigating and exploring 
effective governance mechanisms in buyer-supplier relationship in the context of NPD-
related activities and answer the following research question: 
RQ 2 - How do buyers manage their relationships with suppliers when they outsource NPD 
activities?   
3. Methodology  
The aim of this study is to analyse two stages of the NPD outsourcing process: supplier 
selection and its subsequent management. A qualitative case study method was selected 
because the phenomenon under investigation is new and it is hard to find similar research and 
business cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). We adopted the procedure proposed by Eisenhardt (1989) 
for handling a qualitative analysis: define the content of the analysis, select relevant cases, 
analyze the collected data, and discuss the implications.  
With regard to the content, the focus of the study was to understand the partner selection 
process and the governance mechanisms adopted to manage the outsourcing process in the 
context of NPD.  
In relation to selecting the relevant cases, case studies can involve either single or multiple 
cases (Yin, 2003). We adopted the multiple case study approach, where numerous cases are 
used to analyse the phenomenon, as it can be used to answer our research questions and 
inductively develop theory. Multiple case studies are mainly used to accomplish the 
following research goals: “(1) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (2) predicts 
contrasting results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication)” (Yin, 2003, p. 47). 
Our unit of analysis was thus a dyadic buyer–supplier relationship involving outsourcing 
NPD projects.  
In relation to the rationale for selecting the cases we focused on a supplier that have received 
awards and is pioneer in offering full NPD services in the UK (Tharsus Ltd). Tharsus has 
over 200 employees and has recently received several awards including for Mechanical 
Engineer Manufacturing Excellence, lean manufacturing, green technology innovation 
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(Rushlight Awards), and was named best SME of the year 2012 in the UK. The company has 
also been selected for its advanced collaborative product development approach. Clients of 
the company include the likes of 3M, ITM Power, Safety Kleen, and others.  
In relation to the buyers, the selection was undertaken together with the main contact 
personal at Tharsus. The rationale for selecting buyers was based upon two criteria: 1) the 
supplier’s previous and new customers (ongoing collaborations); 2) both successful and 
unsuccessful collaborations.  
By adopting a multiple case study approach, we are able to highlight the potential similarities 
and variations among the selected case studies (e.g. varying degree of success including 
successful versus unsuccessful outsourcing projects) in relation to supplier selection criteria 
and governance mechanisms when outsourcing NPD activities.  
The qualitative approach was preferred in this case as we aim to explain the how and why of 
the phenomenon under investigation (i.e. why suppliers are selected for NPD activities and 
how the collaboration is governed).  
Semi-structured interviews were used where interviewees were first informed about the 
general purpose of the study, the data treatment and storage, and ethics approval. In total, 14 
in-depth interviews with representatives of nine buyers and one supplier were conducted 
either face-to-face or on the telephone over a period of 4 months. Table 1 illustrates the 
profile of participants.  
The interview template included the following sections: interviewee (e.g. position and job 
history) and company profile (e.g. number of employees, industry sector, and former and 
actual collaborations involving suppliers in NPD); motivation for outsourcing NPD; reasons 
for selecting an outsourcing partner; discussion of the degree of uncertainty in the industry 
and technology relating to NPD; criteria for partner selection and discussion of the 
importance of each (in general); application of the selection criteria to the outsourcing 
partner; governance mechanisms adopted to manage the outsourcing project; problems (if 
any) that emerged during the collaboration; discussion of ways to improve the collaboration 
in the future; innovation outcomes and overall evaluation of the outsourcing supplier.  
The length of interviews varied from 36 to 97 minutes, and the average interview length was 
61 minutes ad data were analysed using thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
Yin (2003) proposes a combination of different sources of evidence for data collection (data 
triangulation). Therefore we collected information from several sources including interviews 
with the selected supplier and former and actual buyers, written and electronic information 
regarding Tharsus and its buyer clients, archival resources, direct observation, articles in 
newspapers, magazines, and other publications.  
To ensure construct validity and reliability, individuals with different roles and from different 
organizational levels in the selected supplier were interviewed (e.g. marketing & sales, R&D, 
operations, management). The findings emerging from the data analysis were checked with 
key informants, and final results incorporated feedback from both formal and informal 
meetings with the supplier, workshops involving industrial suppliers, and academic 
conference presentations.  
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Table 1.  
Profile of firms and interviewees   
 
4. Research Findings 
4.1 Research Question 1 – How do buyers select suppliers when outsourcing NPD activities? 
Our results indicate that in addition to TCE and RBV, relational exchange and co-creation 
theories also contribute to explaining supplier selection when outsourcing NPD activities. 
Table 2 summarises our findings regarding supplier selection and project implementation. 
4.1.1 Transaction Cost Economics factors 
4.1.2 Production costs 
Production costs refer to the costs of actually manufacturing and delivering goods and 
services, which differ from one company to another (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Production 
costs discussed by interviewees include the cost of design or manufacturing or both. This is 
one of the most basic and straightforward criterion used to select a supplier.  
“Again, something that is attractive if someone comes along and says it's going to cost £150,000 to 
design it, we would have thought very hard. But as it is, the cost is being amortised over quite a few 
units over the next couple of years, so that's another attractive part of it.”(Company 5) 
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4.1.3 Coordination costs  
Coordination costs refer to the costs of controlling and monitoring vendors when outsourcing 
goods or services (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Most of the time, firms prefer a long-term 
relationship with their suppliers as changing partners generates additional coordination costs. 
Coordination costs arise from the need to define, negotiate and enforce contracts, as well as 
to monitor and coordinate activities across organizational boundaries (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972). This is especially the case for firms operating in high tech industries where inter-firm 
coordination mechanisms take a longer time to establish and are tailored to a specific 
relationship (Dyer, 1996). Our findings highlight that buyer companies often seek a stable 
and long-term collaboration when outsourcing NPD, thus they favour companies that are 
known to have financial and managerial stability.   
“We are obviously looking for a long-term relationship so we need to be working with a company that 
has stability, financial stability, management stability and again, I think – I've not seen the accounts 
of the company but I think we've got a partner here that is in it for the long haul, and not looking at a 
short-term, quick buck and out.” (Company 5) 
 
4.1.4 Delivery lead-times  
Delivery lead-time has been identified as the second most important criterion for supplier 
selection after quality (Ho, Xu, & Dey, 2010). Delivery time is particularly important since 
delays in delivery may have negative consequences on the buyer, especially in high-
technology industries, which are characterized by complexity and highly interdependent 
relationships between the different components and suppliers. Delays in delivering one 
component may generate higher costs by delaying the whole NPD process, increasing the 
buyer’s coordination costs with other members of its value chain, and generating opportunity 
costs such as those related to speeding up delivery. 
“Also were looking at lead-time as well, so time to deliver the work, whether it's an item or whether 
it's a bit of design work.” (Company 4)   
 
5. Resource-Based View Factors 
5.1 Complementary nature of supplier resources and capabilities  
Our results suggest that the most important criteria used to evaluate supplier capabilities is 
their ability to fulfil a NPD task in an efficient and effective manner. Therefore, gaining 
access to the key knowledge and specific capabilities needed to solve a problem or an issue 
facing the focal firm is important when outsourcing innovation (Hoetker, 2005; Rundquist & 
Hatila, 2010). 
Interviewees also shed light on the importance of the complementary capabilities shown by a 
supplier during the selection process that fits the buyer needs. The identified supplier, for 
instance, could offer design, R&D, and manufacturing competencies to the buyer. According 
to respondents, the supplier was selected because they complemented the in-house 
capabilities and resources of the buyer, making them a complete company according to some 
interviewee’s words. Another interviewee described the supplier as being the manufacturing 
unit of his own company. The quality and complementary characteristics of the supplier’s 
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resources and capabilities were important factors when selecting a supplier and especially for 
building long term relationships.  
Obviously our key core competence is sales and marketing, and I'd like to think product support. 
That's not what Tharsus do. They do the R&D and the manufacture. So, in that sense, we absolutely 
complement each other. If we got together we could be a complete company.” (Company 5) 
 
5.3 Absorptive capacity  
Absorptive capacity is the ability to value external knowledge, to assimilate it, and to 
commercialize it, depending on the similarity of both firms’ knowledge bases (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990, p.128). The findings of this study show that the capability to listen and 
understand the problem and challenges faced by the buyer in an important criterion to secure 
outsourcing NPD projects.  
‘These guys are different, they will listen, they’ll soak up ideas where they can and that is very 
important.’ (Company 4) 
‘good, capability to very rapidly understand what it is you're trying to do.’ (Company 8) 
 
5.4 Quality  
Quality emerged as the most recurrent criterion for suppliers’ selection following a 
systematic review of the literature (Ho, Xu & Dey, 2010; Le Dain, Cheriti & Calvi, 2011). 
Quality is an abstract multi-dimensional concept that changes according to buyer needs (Lai, 
Yeung and Cheng. 2012, Flynn, Schroeder, & Sakakibara, 1994) and embraces the key 
concepts of product quality,  system quality, quality improvement and total quality 
management (Hong and Hartley 2011; Lai & Cheng, 2003; Hoegl and Wagner 2005). Our 
results highlighted that when outsourcing NPD, buyers seek a supplier with quality 
management capabilities that views quality as critical strategic issue, not just an operational 
one (Malik et al 2012). In this case study the supplier had ISO 9000 certification, but had also 
development systems for linking quality improvement with the needs of buyers within a 
quality management framework in a similar manner to those described by Yeung, Cheng, & 
Lai (2005).  
 
Quality, cost and flexibility really are most important criteria for selecting partners… So, you 
know, how much – three key areas, price, quality and the in-house capacity.” (Company 1) 
 
6. Co-creation  
 
In a business to business context, value co-creation is subjective and depends on context and 
nature of buyer-supplier relationships (e.g., Corsaro, Fiocca, Henneberg, & Tunisini, 2013; 
Natti, Pekkarinen, Hartikka & Holappa, 2014). Co-creation as a joint activity has been 
frequently researched in dyadic relationships (Grönroos & Voima, 2013, Hakanen & 
Jaakkola, 2012; Hjelmgren & Dubois, 2013). The results of our study indicate the importance 
of a supplier co-creating value with the buyer by for example working together on NPD 
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design. A supplier that has a capacity to co-create, and specifically, co-design, the product 
with the buyer was preferred.  
 
The participants in this study all mentioned that excellent design and manufacturing 
capabilities critically influenced their decisions to outsource innovation. Unique capabilities 
to integrate both design and manufacturing capabilities as well as to be able to provide 
relevant and substantial insights at an early stage of NPD were important and helped the 
supplier understand the knowledge generated by buyers and smoothly translate a design into 
prototype and then manufacturing process. Design was thus co-created during the early stages 
of the NPD process, which provided opportunities for addressing issues effectively (e.g. 
design a prototype effectively for scalable manufacturing).  
“we have found that they listen, whereas the experience with the last lot was that they knew it all and 
there's little bit of that, what engineers- a trap engineers fall into which is what I call the “not invented 
here” syndrome. So if they haven't thought of it themselves then it's absolute rubbish. These guys are 
different, they will listen, they’ll soak up ideas where they can and that is very important.” (Company 5) 
 
7. Relational exchange theory factors 
7.1 Competence-based trust  
Competence-based trust can be defined as the buyer’s belief in the supplier’s skills and 
technical capabilities to accomplish the project’s goals and deliver to a predefined set of 
standards (Mayer et al., 1995). Interviewees highlighted the importance of competence-based 
trust in mitigating the risks of the buyer rejecting the knowledge coming from suppliers, 
namely the “not invented here” syndrome; enhancing then the buyer’s willingness to 
integrate the supplier’s views and knowledge even at an early stage of the relationship.  
Such judgement of supplier competence is deduced from the past experiences of the supplier 
to deliver similar projects as well as their reputation within the industry in terms of: levels of 
expertise in relevant knowledge domains; quality of capabilities, and soundly diversified 
resources. Other buyers developed their competence-based trust through personal experiences 
as well as initially testing and evaluating supplier capabilities using simple and risk-free 
tasks.  
 
7.2 Integrity-based trust  
Another type of trust emerging from interviews is integrity trust, which is defined as the 
trustor’s perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds 
acceptable (Muthusamy & White, 2005). Integrity-based trust can also be referred to the 
extent to which a trustee is believed to adhere to sound moral and ethical principles, and can 
“I mean, there's a reason that he would be down to things like collaboration.  So, from the 
conversations I’ve had with them so far, they’re easy to work with, come across as open and honest in 
terms of dealings, capability and proven history of delivering similar kinds of products. So it's 
basically we trust them because they can deliver, they have the capabilities, the skills to deliver at the 
standard that you require. I think that succinctly puts it…Very important. Trust, and being able to work 
with them, is probably one of the key things. …. ” (Company 4) 
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be equated with fairness, justice and promise fulfilment (Colquitt et al., 2007). Integrity trust 
in the high-tech sector is particularly important because the first-mover in a new technology 
area can gain a competitive advantage. Our interviews suggest that some buyers provide a 
supplier with nothing more than a patent or a new idea or solution which represent the core 
value or the most important asset of many of the companies in our study. It is then apparent 
that in a context characterised by high uncertainty, the assurance that these ideas and 
knowledge will not be disclosed to a third party is critical in supplier’s selection.    
“It’s trust based on integrity.  I mean, we, at the moment, are still putting together the manufacturing 
agreement. So we have a Heads of Terms, which is about a page and a half or something like that, so 
we don't actually have a piece of paper that ties everyone down to exactly where they need to be. So 
right now it's based on trust, which is- we believe in their integrity and I'd like to think that they believe 
in our integrity. And they made it very plain that they would never have got into bed with us if they 
didn't feel comfortable that they were working with people that they could trust, get on with, work 
together with, or key things.” (Company 5) 
 
7.3 Affect-based trust  
Affect-based trust refers to ‘the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the 
trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive’ (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 719)), namely it is the 
belief in the other party’s good intention to perform as agreed without behaving in an 
opportunistic manner. Affect-based trust is based on the impression that the buyer forms 
about the supplier during their initial interactions. Interviewees from different buyer firms 
highlighted the role that supplier trust and openness played as indicators of the good 
intentions and the benevolent sense of the supplier. In addition, the buyer’s trust in the good 
intentions of the supplier might increase the willingness of the buyer to undertake some risky 
activities and to share their internal knowledge at an early stage of a project.  
Trust is just about the most important thing there is and one of the reasons why we went with Tharsus 
…I work with my suppliers I trust my suppliers. We have open working relationships with suppliers. If 
you don’t have that we can’t basically progress the product anywhere near as well is what we could 
do. (Company 9) 
 
8. Research Question 2: How do buyers manage their relationships with suppliers when the 
outsource NPD activities  
 
8.1 Balance of Formal vs. Informal governance mechanisms  
With regards to relationship management, our findings show that buyers opt for two main 
mechanisms to govern the relationship with a supplier in NPD projects: trust and IP rights 
agreements.  
 
8.1.1 Formal governance mechanisms: Intellectual Property (IP) rights agreement  
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Since individual firms pursue their own interests when dealing with others there is a risk that 
they may act opportunistically. Therefore, it is important to ensure that both firms and 
exchange partners behave in a predictable and stable manner (Williamson, 1985). By 
providing mutually agreed standards of behavior, formal governance obviates private 
incentive seeking, promotes partnership confidence, and thus engenders greater commitment 
in interfirm exchange (Lee & Cavusgil, 2006). One of the most important formal governance 
mechanisms are contractual agreements, which specify the roles and responsibilities of each 
party, stipulate courses of action during unforeseen circumstances, and state the major 
objectives to be achieved (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Based on our interviews, the most 
important contractual aspect in buyer-supplier relationships are IP rights which establish the 
ownership of any new knowledge or new product emerging in interfirm relationships. In 
context of technological uncertainty as in our case study, IP rights seem to be particularly 
important.  
“Yeah, if what we're working on is not protected, then that means we can't share anything until it's 
protected, which can cause a barrier, a delay. So there's that. The necessity of getting agreement like 
NDA and those kind of thing takes time. So they're usually a bit of a barrier. They’re an essential 
thing, but they’re a barrier in many ways too. … Our business is all about IPs so, where very strict on 
what we will give away and what access, to our IP, people have. …we just make prototypes, so all of 
our business is centred around development, generation of IP.” (Company 4) 
 
8. 2 Informal governance mechanisms: Trust  
 
We have discussed above about the different facets of trust. Below, the findings highlight 
how trust is an important factor also in the implementation phase.   
 
8.2.1 Open, Frequent, and Continuous Communication  
Our results suggest that one of the most effective mechanisms for managing an outsourcing 
the lifecycle of a relationship with a supplier in NPD projects is open, continuous, and 
frequent communication efforts aimed at effectively sharing information and knowledge 
related to the project.  Specific buyers established various tools to keep the communication 
between their internal departments and the supplier constantly flowing at every stage of the 
NPD process. They emphasised that a timely and open exchange of information with the 
supplier is a key metric to evaluate the performance of a NPD project. Such effective 
mechanisms for knowledge sharing facilitate further development of trust as both parties are 
aware factors such as costs and tasks in progress at all times. It has also set the scene for 
cultivating a problem solving culture that can tackle any issues that may be encountered as 
soon as they are detected. Some of the mechanisms that have been adopted include: the 
development of committees co-involving personnel from both companies and from different 
business areas; organising frequent meetings and information exchange sessions for progress 
“There's a very high level of trust in our business from engineering up to director level.” 
(Company 8) 
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updates; enabling formal and informal means of communication (e.g. ad hoc direct calls to 
engineers without having to go through project manager); using different channels (e.g. on-
site visits, phone calls, emails, skype calls etc.), and exchanging documents and reports on 
time.  
“I think it’s got to be, sort of, open communication is very key to me. You know, when we place an order 
we’re able to track what’s going on and the progress of that order. And, yeah, make sure that the 
processors are put in place to ensure the quality where it’s, you know it’s key to making sure that the 
processes are developed and put in place from the start to make the quality good…It needs to be 
communication at the right level with the right people, and on a regular basis really.” (Company 1) 
 
8.3 Commitment 
Another important indicator of good collaboration identified by our analysis of the interviews 
is both buyer and supplier commitment. Commitment is defined as a continuing desire to 
maintain or develop a valued relationship and integrates the intention and expectation of 
continuity with the willingness to invest resources in the relationship (Liu et al., 2010). 
Interviewees have clearly stressed the importance of both parties’ willingness to proactively 
engage in the relationship and contribute to success of NPD projects. Supplier commitment is 
manifested through the efforts, time and resources that the supplier invests in maintaining and 
nurturing the relationship. Commitment is crucial for guaranteeing long-term collaboration 
and generating financial and relational gains for all parties as it enhances trust and intimacy 
among partners and reduce the potential risk of conflict, enhancing knowledge sharing at all 
levels.  
 
Table 2.  
Summary of findings  
 TCE RBV Co-creation  RT 
Factors 
affecting 
supplier 
selection  
1)Production costs  
 
2)Coordination 
costs  
 
 
3)Lead-times  
1)Complementarity 
and uniqueness of 
supplier’s 
resources and 
capabilities  
2)Absorptive 
Capacity 
Co-design  1) Competence-
based trust  
 
2) Affect-based 
trust  
 
3) Integrity-
based trust  
“So therefore that’s why I come back to it, its that seeing that the people that you’re working with are 
doing it not just for the money. It’s very, very important, certainly from our point of view that they’re 
almost taking a stake in our business. You know, so it’s almost that– that’s what I’m saying is, and I 
believe the way that Tharsus would see working with us is that they’d be actually taking stage in our 
business and the better job they can do, the more products we sell, the more business they get. And 
that’s where it’s sort of based down towards rather than just give us more cash, you know.” (Company 
3) 
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3)Quality  
 Formal mechanisms  Informal mechanisms  
Factors 
affecting 
outsourcing 
project 
implementation 
and knowledge 
transfer   
1) NDA and IP rights agreement  1)Trust  
 
2)Commitment  
 
3)Open, frequent and 
continuous communication  
 
 
9. Discussion  
 
Scholars have called for a combinative approach to studying the complex phenomenon of 
strategic outsourcing that crosses theoretical disciplines (Hatonen & Eriksson, 2009). In this 
paper, we explore the complex process that firms go through when selecting a potential 
partner to outsource their innovation-related activities. Our findings highlight the criteria that 
buyers perceive as important when evaluating potential suppliers and managing NPD 
outsourcing relationships.  
Our results suggest that in conditions of high technological uncertainty, a buyer firm elects a 
supplier to perform NPD activities and processes using criteria that have previously been 
explained using four separate theories: TCE, RBV, co-creation, and relational exchange 
theory. In this study we identify factors that link these theories and by doing so help explain 
supplier selection and relationship management when outsourcing NPD. These factors 
include: the costs linked to production, coordination, governance and delivery lead times 
(TCE factors); the capacity to co-design and to provide inputs (co-creation ); the expected 
quality of outputs, and complementarity of the supplier’s resources and capabilities (RBV), as 
well as the willingness to take a risk and the different types of trust (relation exchange 
theory).  
Drawing upon the results of our research, we can conclude that suppliers that deliver on time, 
help reduce coordination, governance and transaction costs; have complementary as well as 
heterogeneous capabilities; are capable of understanding the entire NPD process and are able 
to add value to it; as well as show commitment, competency, reliability, and honesty will be 
preferred as outsourcing partners for the development of new products. Our findings show 
that under high levels of technological uncertainty, firms select knowledgeable and 
competent suppliers rather than lower cost suppliers which is agreement with previous studies 
(Hoetker, 2005; Koufteros et al., 2007; Rundquist & Hatila, 2010). More specifically, 
knowledge and an understanding of the entire product development process seem to be 
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particularly important when evaluating potential suppliers in the context of outsourcing NPD 
in conditions of technological uncertainty.   
An interesting finding is the relational view appears to provide a solid theoretical foundation 
for analysing the factors that influence partner selection when outsourcing innovation. Many 
companies are increasingly outsourcing and sometimes even offshoring value-generating 
activities  and processes of a ‘knowledge-intensive’ nature (i.e. R&D) as well as core 
capabilities (e.g. Martinez-Noya & Garcia-Canal, 2012), which entails a high degree of 
appropriation risks associated with opportunism and uncertainty. Interfirm relational 
exchange theory as well as co-creation theory both provide a framework for the focal firm to 
choose the right partner/supplier. This result is particularly important as it shows that 
companies are increasingly looking for trusted partners when outsourcing value-generating 
NPD activities. We show that due to the uncertainty inherited in the process of developing 
new products and the novelty of knowledge and technologies involved, it is very difficult to 
evaluate a supplier before the start of a project based on the conventional criteria of costs, 
resources, and capabilities. Instead, firms develop perceptions of the integrity and 
competence of a supplier and assess their co-creation capabilities in an effort to predict the 
behaviour and ability of suppliers to accomplish NPD goals and tasks in the best possible 
way.  
Buyers focusing on the outsourcing of NPD activities choose suppliers that they trust because 
of their competences, integrity and benevolence. Both competence and integrity-based trusts 
are derived from a rational judgment; while affect-based trust reflects more subjective and 
emotional beliefs towards the supplier (Mayer et al., 1995). The former types of trust are 
calculative and based on rational assessments of the supplier’s ability and track record 
including their: reputation within the industry; conduct; past experience with the buyer; 
history to deliver similar projects to the standards needed, and the like.  
Our results suggest that even though affect-based trust is more subjective, it can be a pivotal 
factor that the buyer considers when selecting a supplier, confirming the results of previous 
studies (Das & Teng, 2001). Accordingly, affect-based trust reduces the perceived risk that 
the supplier will behave in an opportunistic manner; and opens doors for cultivating a basis 
for an open and collaborative relationship, enhancing knowledge flows and idea sharing 
earlier on, and increasing the supplier’s willingness and commitment to fulfil their agreement 
(Sengun, 2010; Das & Teng, 2001).  
Our findings confirm that competence and integrity based trust complement and reinforce 
each other in the supplier selection process. This is particularly important in high-tech 
industries where the quality (degree of innovativeness) and efficiency (time and cost to 
innovate) of innovation is highly valued. For instance, competence-based trust facilitates the 
extent and efficiency of learning among firms by enhancing their potential absorptive 
capacity (Luo, 2006). Competence-based trust plays a significant role in the supplier selection 
process as buyers need to be confident that the supplier will be able to deliver the objectives 
of the project efficiently and effectively and overcome any challenges related to creative 
processes. In addition, competence-based trust enhances the buyer’s belief that the supplier is 
able to adjust to ever changing needs in the market. Integrity-based trust is also important 
especially in contexts where knowledge is not yet clearly defined and time to market is 
important.  High levels of integrity-based trust will minimize barriers associated with 
accessing knowledge at an early stage, reduce the need for writing a detailed contractual 
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agreement, and mitigate the risks associated with the leakage of the buyer’s unique 
knowledge to other companies.  
In view of the complex role played by this multi-dimensional concept, we recommend that 
future research should consider the influence played by each dimension of trust when 
outsourcing innovation. Based on our results we agree with Sengun’s (2010) proposition that 
trust per se does not guarantee inter-firm learning and that it is the type of trust that matters.  
In relation to the implementation stage, previous studies have highlighted the importance of 
relational factors including trust in governing the relationship between buyers and suppliers 
supporting the findings of research focussing on  inter-firm contexts (e.g. Thorgren & 
Wincent, 2011; Caniels, Gelderman & Vermeulen, 2012; Ford et al., 2012). However, in this 
study we have stressed the complementary nature of formal mechanisms, such as IP rights 
contracts, which are utilised to protect a firms’ proprietary intellectual property, as well as 
informal mechanisms, such as trust, commitment and communication quality when 
outsourcing NPD. This finding confirms the results of a study that explored enablers of 
knowledge transfer in China that concluded that trust and contracts have a positive joint 
effect (Zhang & Zhou, 2013). 
In this paper, we have investigated the role of trust before and after the establishment of the 
outsourcing relationship. Our findings suggest that trust between the buyer and potential 
supplier can be exhibited in different forms based on either subjective (affect-based) or more 
rational (integrity and competence-based) assessments. The combination of these three 
different types of trust provides a solid foundation for developing strong relationships. This 
relationship development is reinforced by quality (open and accurate), as well as the 
frequency of communication and other coordination mechanisms that can be put in place to 
facilitate knowledge sharing and mutual learning between the supplier and its buyer. 
Openness of communication also has a crucial role as it helps partners to discus difficult 
situations and resolve conflicts easily and quickly without having to escalate them to higher 
management. Our results suggest that the preliminary forms of trust between the buyer and its 
supplier, especially competence and integrity-based trust, facilitate the generally tedious and 
lengthy process of contracting, increasing efficiency, and enhancing open and frequent 
communication. Effective coordination mechanisms, in its turn, facilitate cooperation and 
knowledge sharing, which subsequently results in the development of more relationship 
specific trust and mutual commitment.  
Our results also show that there is a reinforcing relationship between formal (e.g. IP rights, 
NDA-Non Disclosure Agreement) and informal governance (e.g. trust, commitment) 
mechanisms when outsourcing NPD. In our case study the supplier created favourable 
conditions by giving away a potential opportunity to own IP rights to buyers, but by doing so 
created a trustworthy relationship. The innovative nature of NPD projects in our study, means 
it is very difficult to develop IP agreements that includes all contingencies and specifications 
because the knowledge and the related competences emerging from any collaboration are not 
usually known at the start of a collaborative project and thus they cannot be detailed in 
written agreements. There is however a very good level of trust and commitment that makes 
the buyers feel safe that the supplier will not behave in an opportunistic way. These 
conditions, in combination with effective communication mechanisms, contribute to 
facilitating the transfer of knowledge and information which is fundamental in the 
implementation stage of outsourcing NPD. Thus, formal and informal mechanisms 
complement each other when outsourcing NPD projects as both mechanisms contribute to a 
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healthy relationship.   Our findings highlight that communication is important in the 
implementation of an outsourcing project, which is consistent with the results of previous 
research (Hong & Hartley, 2011; Hoegl & Wagner, 2005, Tuten & Urban, 2001).  
 
10. Limitations and future research  
This study has some limitations. First, due to financial and time constraints, the selected 
companies and supplier were all located in the UK with most participating buyers operate in 
the clean-tech industry. Future research should consider a more diverse sample and conduct a 
similar study in different countries than UK. Our study was based on the development of new 
products in conditions of high technological uncertainty. The replication of the study in 
another context, such as where technological uncertainty is low, could reveal different 
findings. For instance, competence and integrity-based trust may not emerge as key criteria to 
select suppliers in such contexts. Additionally, affect and competence-based trust may 
emerge after a history of collaboration with a supplier.  
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